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Protecting Low Income Residents During Tax 
Increment Financing Redevelopment 
Kristen Erickson  
INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, tax increment financing (TIF) was used to fund the 
addition of a high-end department store to a suburban mall located in 
a wealthy outer suburb of St. Louis, Missouri.
1
 Over a decade later, 
another TIF project is in the works in the blighted, burned out, and 
mostly abandoned north St. Louis city, seeking to bring development, 
as well as vibrancy and affluence, back to that neighborhood.
2
 These 
two projects are examples of the uses to which tax increment 
financing, generally designed for redevelopment of blighted inner 
cities,
3
 has been put. Both projects also showcase potential problems 
associated with their use. On the one hand, TIF has been used rather 
effectively in wealthier communities to fund large commercial retail 
development. However, development using TIF in these wealthier 
 
 
 J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; M.S.W. (2011), George Warren 
Brown School of Social Work, Washington University in St. Louis; B.A., History (2002), 
Davidson College. I would like to thank Professor Daniel R. Mandelker for help in selecting my 
topic. 
 1. Dan Mihalopoulos, West County Mall Wins Initial Backing; Panel Agrees Center is 
Blighted, Needs Subsidy, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1997, at C1. 
 2. Tim Logan, McKee Scales Back TIF Request for Northside, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 2009, at A1. 
 3. The legislative findings or purposes that introduce many states‘ TIF statutes 
demonstrate this goal of redevelopment of blighted communities. For example, Iowa‘s statute 
allows municipal governments to conduct redevelopment programs using a combination of 
private and public resources to ―eliminate slums and prevent the development or spread of 
slums and urban blight and to encourage needed urban rehabilitation.‖ IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 403.3 (West 1999). Nebraska‘s TIF statute begins with legislative findings stating that there 
exist ―areas which have deteriorated and become substandard and blighted because of the 
unsafe, insanitary, inadequate, or overcrowded condition of the dwellings therein,‖ and that ―the 
prevention and elimination of blight is a matter of state policy, public interest, and statewide 
concern.‖ NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2102 (2007). 
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communities has been criticized
4
 because it is argued that these 
wealthy communities are less in need of tax incentives to stimulate 
retail development, and this kind of development takes growth 
opportunities from poor, blighted communities, which are seriously 
in need of such tax incentives. On the other hand, when TIF funding 
has been used to redevelop poor communities, problems have 
occurred when the lower-income residents of these communities are 
displaced to make room for higher-income residential and 
commercial development.
5
  
This Note will examine urban redevelopment and the use of TIF, 
particularly focusing on its impact on low-income individuals, 
families, and communities. Part I describes the history of urban 
redevelopment. Part II provides a definition of tax increment 
financing and a description of its purpose and function. Part III 
analyzes state TIF statutes, the present-day use of tax increment 
financing, and the current need for responsibility towards lower-
income individuals in its use. Finally, Part IV proposes modifications 
to the use of TIF so that development might occur more responsibly 
in poor communities and respond to the needs of the lower-income 
residents of those communities. 
I. HISTORY OF CITIES AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 
During the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, a substantial increase occurred in 
the concentration of inner-city poverty, which has continued to 
plague city cores since.
6
 With the advent of school desegregation, 
families with financial means, aided by the construction of interstate 
highways, moved to the suburbs.
7
 Those who were left in the inner 
 
 4. See, e.g., Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF: Why Missouri Needs Tax Increment Financing 
Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 920–23 (1999).  
 5. Keasha Broussard, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban Revitalization 
Against the Backdrop of the Takings Clause, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 99, 109–10 (2000).  
 6. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 140 (1987). 
 7. Id. at 135–36. In addition, many upper- and middle-income minority families who had 
the means to move out of the inner cities did so. In the 1940s and 1950s, when all minority 
families were confined by segregation (state-sponsored in some parts of the country or de facto 
segregation in others) to the same central city neighborhoods, those communities were 
socioeconomically diverse, and the upper- and middle-class minority families contributed to 
neighborhood stability and ensured the communities had adequate services. As desegregation 
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cities were those without the means to relocate easily.
8
 Moreover, 
zoning was used in the suburbs to prevent the poor from relocating 
there.
9
  
In recent years, some inner cities have begun to revitalize 
themselves as middle- and upper-income residents have begun to 
move back,
10
 resulting in the relocation of some lower-income 
residents into neighboring poor communities
11
 or into older, decaying 
inner-ring suburbs.
12
 Areas into which the lower-income residents 
move subsequently face a rise in poverty.
13
 As a result, inner cities 
today are often characterized by extreme polarization in wealth: rich, 
 
began and suburbs grew, these wealthier minority families also moved out of the urban minority 
areas, leaving exclusively the poor and most disadvantaged in the central cities. Id. at 143. 
 8. Id. 
 9. For example, zoning in the suburbs was used to prevent the construction of multi-
family and rental residences, which essentially barred lower income families or individuals 
from being able to afford housing in those areas. See Erica Frankenberg, Splintering School 
Districts: Understanding the Link Between Segregation and Fragmentation, 34 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 869, 871–72 (2009). 
 10. See J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405–07 (2003). 
This movement of upper- and middle-income residents back into inner cities is generally 
considered to be gentrification. Gentrification is defined as the process by which middle- and 
upper-income people move into previously lower-income neighborhoods to redevelop, 
revitalize, and rebuild the community in a way that best fits their own needs. It is disputed 
whether gentrification necessarily implies that the lower-income people who live in the 
neighborhood are pushed out, but often lower-income residents are relocated to make room for 
the new higher-income residents. Id. 
 11. Broussard, supra note 5, at 109–10.  
 12. Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and Racial Justice 
Achievable in the United States?, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 47 n.44 (2009). These inner-ring 
suburbs are where white flight initially was directed. However, as urban sprawl has continued, 
middle and upper income residents have moved to outer suburbs from the old inner ring 
suburbs, leaving these older suburbs as the new locus of poverty. Id. 
 13. John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act 
at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 610 n.41 (2008). This movement of poverty caused by gentrification 
has come with an overall decrease in the number of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. Id. 
However, the decrease in the number of neighborhoods of concentrated poverty does not mean 
there has been a corresponding decrease in poverty as a whole. Studies have shown that in the 
early years of the twenty-first century, poverty rates have actually increased in the central cities. 
Id. at 610.  
 As poverty rises in inner-ring suburbs, those municipalities are beginning to exhibit 
similarities to the impoverished central city. These older suburbs face increased demands for 
education and health care as their populations, particularly their lower-income populations, 
increase. Furthermore, because these municipalities are smaller than their central city 
counterparts, inner-ring suburbs‘ municipal governments face even greater struggles to provide 
the infrastructure and services to meet the needs of the poor. Id. 
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newly developed downtowns bordered by extremely poor 
neighborhoods.
14
  
Present-day revitalization is part of the redevelopment movement, 
started in the mid-twentieth century with the purpose of improving 
the appearance and economy of poverty-stricken inner cities.
15
 
Initially, the federal government took a leading role in funding urban 
redevelopment; in 1949, the federal Housing Act was created to 
provide funds for urban redevelopment.
16
 The primary purpose of this 
law was slum clearance,
17
 yet the law contained little in the way of 
protections for the poor whose neighborhoods were the targets of the 
slum clearance.
18
 The law allowed redevelopment in low-income 
residential areas, but lacked any requirement for the replacement of 
low-cost housing that redevelopment destroyed.
19
  
Over the second half of the twentieth century, redevelopment 
projects gradually shifted from being federally funded to being 
locally funded and controlled.
20
 In the 1970s, The Housing and 
 
 14. Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic 
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 332 (1999). 
 15. Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central City with 
Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689, 699–701 (1994).  
 16. Id. at 700. 
 17. Id. at 700–01. The assumption behind the theory of slum clearance was that the 
destruction of slum housing would end the problems associated with the slum housing, such as 
crime and poverty, benefitting both the residents of that housing and the city as a whole. Id.  
 18. Barbara L. Bezdek, To Attain “The Just Rewards of So Much Struggle”: Local-
Resident Equity Participation in Urban Revitalization, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37, 40 (2006) 
(noting that criticism of recent redevelopment efforts that have pushed the poor out of their 
neighborhoods is ironic given that urban redevelopment has never been concerned with 
protection for the poor). 
 19. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (originally codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1451–1460 (2006)), omitted by Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)). 
Low-income housing that was cleared under the U.S. Housing Act was often replaced with 
high-cost housing, a process that did clear the slums, but the Act did not provide replacement 
housing options for former slum residents. The lack of a connection between slum clearance 
and protection for the poor and affordable housing was expressed in a statement made by an 
Ohio senator commenting on an early version of this bill: ―I am in favor of the slum elimination 
section. I am opposed to the public housing section.‖ Quinones, supra note 15, at 700. 
 20. See Quinones, supra note 15, at 704. Another shift that has taken place in 
redevelopment has been the transition from redevelopment of residential areas to economic 
redevelopment focused on commercial and industrial growth. Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: 
Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 305, 316–17 (2004). This shift has led to less destruction of affordable housing. 
Quinones, supra note 15, at 703 n.36. However, when affordable housing is destroyed now, it is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
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Community Development Act
21
 replaced the Housing Act. This new 
federal statute created Community Development Block Grants 
(CDBGs), which provided blocks of money to be used for 
redevelopment or other city purposes.
22
 CDBGs were often used for 
downtown redevelopment,
23
 as their primary purpose was ―the 
development of viable urban communities, by providing decent 
housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic 
opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income.‖24 
The Act continued to authorize slum clearance.
25
 Through these 
block grants, local governments were provided with more control in 
the redevelopment process, allowing them to allocate money 
according to local priorities.
26
 
During the last several decades, funding from CDBGs has 
declined, with no offsetting increase in federal funding for local 
redevelopment.
27
 As a result, greater control and funding 
responsibility has shifted to local governments.
28
 During those same 
decades, property tax revolts occurred in most states, and as a result 
of those revolts, voters placed limits on property tax rates, tax 
assessments, and debt.
29
 The rise of the use of TIF funding for 
 
far less likely that it will be replaced by another residential development and more likely that it 
will be replaced by commercial and industrial development. See Gordon, supra, at 316–17. 
 21. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 
(current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301–18 (2006)).  
 22. Id.  
 23. Quinones, supra note 15, at 704. 
 24. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, P.L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 
(current version as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301–18 (2006)). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Quinones, supra note 15, at 704. 
 27. Id. at 705. The new method by which the federal government financially supports 
urban redevelopment is through offering federal tax breaks on interest paid on bonds used to 
finance redevelopment. Id. 
 28. Id. at 704. 
 29. The property tax revolts were heralded by California‘s Proposition 13 in 1978, which 
required that property tax levels be decreased to 1975 levels and put strict limitations on 
increases in the tax rate and in the assessment rate. Voters in other states followed suit by 
limiting tax rates or state revenues. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 355–57 (6th ed. 2006). For example, Missouri‘s Hancock 
Amendment sets forth a formula that limits the amount of revenue that can be raised by the state 
through taxes. MO. CONST. art. X, § 18(a). Further restrictions are placed on state and local 
governments through limitations on the amount of debt that the government may incur. See 
MANDELKER, supra, at 391–94. 
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redevelopment can be explained by the decrease in federal funding 
provided to local governments, the resulting increase in demand for 
local funds for these projects, and a simultaneous refusal to pay 
higher taxes. Tax increment financing allows local governments to 
raise funds for the redevelopment that voters demand, without having 
to raise taxes or incur debt.
30
 
II. TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: THE BASICS AND HISTORY 
A. Definition and How TIF Works 
Tax increment financing is a tool used to attract developers in 
order to restore blighted areas through private development.
31
 In a tax 
increment financing scheme, it is assumed that private redevelopment 
will cause an increase in the tax base, which will be used to pay for 
the development—in other words, redevelopment under TIF is 
supposed to pay for itself.
32
 Because it does not put a large financial 
burden on the municipality, TIF has become a primary method for 
funding urban redevelopment.
33
  
The TIF process begins with an area being designated as a TIF 
district.
34
 Tax exempt bonds are issued to private investors to fund 
the project.
35
 The property tax base in the TIF district is assessed at 
 
 30. P. Michael Juby, Tax Increment Financing in North Carolina: The Myth of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1526, 1529 (2005).  
 31. Frank S. London, The Use of Tax Increment Financing to Attract Private Investment 
and Generate Redevelopment in Virginia, 20 VA. TAX REV. 777, 778–79 (2001). TIF funds can 
be used for a broad range of activities associated with redevelopment, including: staff costs to 
implement and administer the redevelopment plan; services such as planning, architectural, and 
legal; training costs; property assembly; relocation; demolition; site preparation; rehabilitation 
of buildings; bond financing and interest payments. Michael T. Peddle, TIF in Illinois: The 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 443 (1997). 
 32. London, supra note 31, at 778–79 (2001). London argues that this set-up makes TIF a 
low risk redevelopment method. Id.  
 33. Christina G. Dudley, Tax Increment Financing for Redevelopment in Missouri: Beauty 
and the Beast, 54 UMKC L. REV. 77, 202 (1985). 
 34. London, supra note 31, at 778–79. 
 35. Id. at 780–81. The federal government has limited the use of tax exempt bonds by 
municipalities in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 387–88. Bonds 
used for redevelopment are only tax exempt if they are qualified redevelopment bonds, which 
are defined as bonds designed so that at least 95 percent of proceeds will be used for 
redevelopment of an area that is blighted and the bonds will be paid off from tax revenue. Id.; 
26 U.S.C. § 144(c) (2006). Because the interest on these bonds is tax exempt, municipalities or 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
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the time the project begins, and the property tax that will be received 
by the government and special districts is frozen at that level for the 
life of the project (typically twenty to forty years).
36
 As development 
occurs, property taxes should rise, and the increase in tax revenue 
above the frozen level, known as the tax increment, is paid to the 
redevelopment agency or authority to pay off bonds and invest in 
further development.
37
  
TIF districts are understood to attract businesses in two ways. 
First, funds from bonds can pay for write-down costs to developers as 
they begin redevelopment and to pay for other incentives to attract 
businesses.
38
 Second, funds are used to improve infrastructure in the 
blighted area, which it is assumed will attract additional business to 
the area.
39
 The tax exempt nature of the bonds provides further 
incentive to developers because interest rates paid on the bonds can 
be lower, saving money for the developer.
40
 
B. Current TIF Statutory Requirements 
Many states‘ TIF statutes require that the area to be redeveloped 
be blighted in order for TIF to be used.
41
 ―Blight‖ is a term generally 
 
developers can pay lower interest rates, making them more affordable for local governments. 
Catherine Michel, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 
IND. L.J. 457, 461 (1996).  
 TIF bonds can be backed by the full faith and credit of the local government, which would 
make the bonds even less risky and thus further decrease the interest rate. However, most 
municipalities do not back TIF bonds with their full faith and credit so as to avoid debt 
limitations. When bonds are not backed by a municipality‘s full faith and credit, they do not 
count as debt for the purposes of limitations on municipal debt. MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 
393. TIF bonds are generally not considered to be bound under state constitutional debt 
limitations, so municipalities can issue TIF bonds without having to reduce other forms of debt. 
See, e.g., Fults v. City of Coralville, 666 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 2003) (holding that TIF bonds are 
not constitutional debt). 
 36. London, supra note 31, at 780–81. 
 37. Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and 
Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 162–64 (1998).  
 38. London, supra note 31, at 787. 
 39. Id. 
 40. However, the interest rate of TIF bonds does tend to be higher than general obligation 
bonds issued by municipal governments, which are less risky because they are backed by the 
full faith and credit of the local government, which means that the government promises to pay 
off the bonds from the government‘s own general revenue. In contrast, TIF bonds are riskier 
because they are backed only by the tax increment. Id. at 781. 
 41. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810(1) (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2109 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
210 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 36:203 
 
 
used to mean that the area is deteriorated. For example, Iowa‘s TIF 
statute provides a typical definition of blight:  
[A] substantial number of slum, deteriorated, or deteriorating 
structures; defective or inadequate street layout; . . . insanitary 
or unsafe conditions; . . . the existence of conditions which 
endanger life or property by fire and other causes; . . . 
constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to 
the public health, safety, or welfare . . . .
42
  
Furthermore, many states also require that the project pass a ―but for‖ 
test, which requires that the area would not have been redeveloped 
but for the TIF project.
43
 However, in practice, both of these tests 
have proven easy to pass. Developers have been able to easily prove 
blight, as courts have generally upheld determinations of blight made 
by redevelopment authorities.
44
 Determinations that a TIF district 
 
(2007). Some state statutes require that the area be deteriorating but do not use the term 
―blight.‖ See, e.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.005 (2008) (requiring that the area contain ―a 
substantial number of substandard, slum, deteriorated, or deteriorating structures‖). 
 An interesting development that has occurred in blight requirements is the statutory 
provision allowing TIF not only in currently blighted areas, but in other areas, known as 
conservation areas, that may become blighted in the future. Statutes with conservation district 
provisions allow TIF (and eminent domain) to be used in older areas, even if they are not 
blighted. Missouri‘s TIF statute describes a conservation district as an area ―in which fifty 
percent or more of the structures in the area have an age of thirty-five years or more. Such an 
area is not yet a blighted area but is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare 
and may become a blighted area.‖ MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.805(3) (West 2008). Missouri‘s only 
requirement for designating an area as a conservation area is that more half of the structures are 
over thirty-five years old. This statute encompasses thriving, viable older communities that 
could be taken for redevelopment only because of their age. Redevelopment was proposed 
using this provision for an older, middle-class neighborhood in St. Louis County that did not 
contain homes that were empty or blighted, but that were merely older than surrounding areas. 
Goshorn, supra note 4, at 920. 
 Some states, primarily Minnesota and Michigan, have completely done away with the 
blight requirement. In Minnesota, for example, the TIF statute places almost no requirements or 
limitations on its use. Dudley, supra note 33, at 87; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 479.1781 
(West 2008). 
 42. IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.17 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). 
 43. Juby, supra note 30, at 1530–31; see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810 (West 2008) 
(requiring that the TIF district ―has not been subject to growth and development through 
investment by private enterprise and would not reasonably be anticipated to be developed 
without the adoption of tax increment financing‖).  
 44. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 321. In fact, in St. Louis, a suburban shopping mall in 
one of the more affluent suburbs was found to be blighted because the developer would be able 
to triple the number of shops and add a Nordstrom‘s. Mihalopoulos, supra note 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Protecting Low Income Residents 211 
 
 
passes the ―but for‖ test have also generally been upheld by courts 
because of the difficulty of proving whether development would have 
happened without the TIF district.
45
 
Most state statutes providing for the use of TIF to finance 
redevelopment have limited protections for lower-income 
populations,
46
 although several states have enacted more extensive 
protections for low income residents.
47
 Protections for the poor in TIF 
statutes generally fall into one of several categories: relocation 
assistance,
48
 (re)building of affordable housing,
49
 citizen 
participation,
50
 or provision of funding for schools.
51
 California‘s TIF 
statute is an example of a statute that provides more extensively for 
the needs of lower-income people. California gives incentives to 
developers who produce low-income housing or services to aid low-
income residents,
52
 requires that at least 20 percent of the tax 
increment be set aside to create or maintain low-income housing,
53
 
 
 45. Gordon, supra note 20, at 323–24.  
 46. The primary requirement, and in many states the only requirement, for where TIF may 
be used is that an area be designated as blighted. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810(1) (West 
2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2109 (2007). As noted above, some states allow not just blighted 
areas, but also conservation areas at risk of blight in the future to be taken for redevelopment. 
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.805(3) (West 2008).  
 47. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 65915 (West 2009); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 33334.2 (West 2009); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413 (West Supp. 2010).  
 48. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810(1)(4) (West 2008); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
620/3(e)(8) (West 2008). Wisconsin‘s statute requires the redevelopment authority to create a 
plan to ensure that residents displaced by the redevelopment are provided with opportunities for 
temporary relocation. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1333(10) (West Supp. 2010). Michigan also 
requires a redevelopment plan that establishes a relocation assistance priority system. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 125.1816 (2)(m)-(n) (West 2006). Finally, the Texas statute requires the 
redevelopment authority to make a statement concerning the proposed method for relocation. 
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.011 (West 2008). 
 49. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1331(7) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Iowa‘s statute contains 
provisions both for the relocation of displaced residents and for the rebuilding of lower-income 
units destroyed in the redevelopment process. IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.22 (West Supp. 2010). 
The Iowa courts have construed this statute to require the rebuilding of low-income housing 
only when the redevelopment is residential in nature. If redevelopment is for commercial or 
industrial purposes, low-income housing need not be replaced. See McMurray v. City Council 
of Des Moines, 642 N.W.2d 273, 280–81 (Iowa 2002); Knudson v. City of Decorah, 622 
N.W.2d 42, 49–50 (Iowa 2000).  
 50. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1820 (West 2006). 
 51. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1333(5r) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 52. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 65915 (West 2009).  
 53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.2(a) (West 2010). California courts have 
enforced this provision. See Craig v. City of Poway, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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and requires timely replacement of low-income housing destroyed by 
redevelopment.
54
  
C. History of the Use of TIF 
The first TIF statute appeared in California in 1952.
55
 For decades, 
few other states created TIF statutes of their own, until the 1970s and 
1980s when direct federal funds for redevelopment dried up. Today 
almost every state has a TIF statute.
56
 TIF was originally intended as 
a tool for redevelopment of distressed urban communities to create 
better housing, as evidenced by the blight standard most TIF statutes 
employ.
57
 Over time, though, courts have concluded that TIF need 
not be used solely for the development of low-cost housing for 
impoverished communities.
58
 For example, most TIF statutes provide 
the redevelopment authority with the power to use eminent domain,
59
 
and many courts allow eminent domain in TIF to be used merely for 
economic reasons, rather than strictly for a public purpose such as 
providing low-income housing.
60
  
 
4th 1994); Fontana Redevelopment Agency v. Torres, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 
4th 2007). 
 54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). This provision 
has also been enforced by California courts. See Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1264 (E.D. Cal. 2005).  
 55. Gordon, supra note 20, at 313. 
 56. Id. at 313–14. 
 57. The legislative findings and purposes that introduce many states‘ TIF statutes 
demonstrate their commitment to revitalizing blighted neighborhoods. See IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 403.2 (West Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-2102 (2007). 
 58. Rogers, supra note 37, at 161. Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of 
the use of TIF even in situations in which there was no direct public benefit. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.330 (West 2008). 
 60. Rogers, supra note 37, at 152. In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held 
that eminent domain may be used for purely economic purposes, rather than strictly for public 
purposes. Moreover, the court held that eminent domain may be used to transfer private 
property into the hands of private individuals. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). The use of eminent domain in TIF statutes to transfer private property to private 
developers or commercial and industrial entities reflects similar ideas. However, after Kelo was 
decided, many state governments have sought to restrict the broad reach of its holding to 
prevent takings that would transfer private property from one private owner to another simply 
in the name of economic development, even though TIF itself continues to be used for private 
development. George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic 
Development: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School 
Districts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 74–75 (2008).  
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In practice, TIF funding has been used in two distinct ways: to 
revitalize poor urban communities, replacing blighted areas with 
middle and upper-income residential development or commercial and 
industrial development,
61
 and to finance commercial development in 
wealthy or middle-income suburban areas.
62
 These uses of TIF can be 
traced both to municipal residents‘ desire to avoid paying additional 
property tax
63
 and to reduced federal funding for redevelopment and 
services for the poor, such as affordable housing.
64
 At the same time 
that cities have faced reduced federal funding, they have been less 
able to increase property tax rates to replace lost federal funding, 
forcing them to rely more on sales taxes or increases in the property 
tax base.
65
 Therefore, cities have chosen to replace low-income 
residential communities with high-income residential
66
 and 
commercial redevelopment in order to increase both the property tax 
base and sales taxes.
67
  
III. ANALYSIS: IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF TIF 
When TIF has been used to redevelop distressed urban 
neighborhoods, development has often occurred in ways that are not 
 
 61. Quinones, supra note 15, at 692. 
 62. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 317–20. 
 63. Quinones, supra note 15, at 696–701. 
 64. Id. at 705–06. 
 65. Property taxes are determined by multiplying the tax rate by the tax base. If 
governments are unable to raise the tax rate, they can increase overall tax revenue by increasing 
the tax base. See MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 256. 
 66. In addition to the basic idea that higher-income residential units increase property tax 
revenue, the replacement of lower-income units with higher-income homes can be explained by 
the assumption that homeownership is superior to tenancy, an idea that is fundamental to 
gentrification. The problem that arises is that many tenants do not have the resources to become 
homeowners, so rental units will still be needed. See Broussard, supra note 5, at 109–10. 
 67. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 332–33. This effort to replace residential development 
with commercial development to increase sales tax revenue has been most frequently used in 
states that depend to a great extent on sales taxes to raise local revenue. Id. To allow 
municipalities to further benefit from increased sales tax revenue during TIF projects, sales 
taxes have been included as part of the increment of the TIF so that increased sales taxes can go 
back into development of the TIF district. Id. Courts are willing to uphold the replacement of 
lower-income housing with upper-income residential and commercial development under the 
theory that it benefits the larger community and in this way contributes to the public purpose 
needed to satisfy the blight tests. Matthew J. Parlow, Unintended Consequences: Eminent 
Domain and Affordable Housing, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 859 (2006).  
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responsible to lower-income residents. For example, redevelopment 
has been used to gentrify neighborhoods by removing lower-income 
residents.
68
 Low-cost residential units are demolished under the guise 
of slum clearance, but they are generally not replaced with more low-
cost units. Instead, middle- and upper-income housing is built in its 
place,
69
 or more often, commercial
70
 and industrial development 
replaces what was once residential.
71
 As a result, lower-income 
residents who originally lived in the neighborhoods and were 
relocated during demolition and construction are unable to move 
back once the redevelopment is complete.
72
  
The forced migration of lower-income residents out of their 
neighborhoods has several negative consequences. First, this 
relocation generally results in increasing concentrations of poverty in 
 
 68. See Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 95. 
 69. Parlow, supra note 67, at 848. As Parlow notes, this process ―directly benefits the 
wealthy and powerful at the expense of poor and often ethnic minority communities.‖ Id. at 
859. 
 70. The argument has been made that using TIF exclusively for commercial development, 
such as shopping malls and hotels, rather than industrial development, is not beneficial to the 
entire region. Commercial development, it is argued, does not infuse new capital into the 
regional economy; rather it only relocates businesses that would have been built somewhere 
else in the region. Therefore, TIF that focuses merely on commercial development may not 
provide benefits on a regional level. Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 94. At the same time, the 
relocation of commercial enterprises to a poorer neighborhood may serve to infuse more money 
and jobs into that local economy, benefitting the community on a local level, as long as poorer 
residents are not displaced as a result of the commercial development.  
 An additional concern with commercial TIF projects is that they tend to be politically 
driven rather than influenced by the needs of the community. It is argued that politicians use 
TIF to bring in large scale projects, such as convention centers, designed to enhance their own 
prestige, rather than focusing on community needs. Michel, supra note 35, at 469–70. 
 71. See Bezdek, supra note 18, at 38. 
 72. Id. The pushing out of lower-income residents occurs when the redevelopment attracts 
higher-income individuals. As higher-income people move in, prices rise for both housing and 
consumer goods. As a result, lower-income residents can no longer afford to live in the 
neighborhood and must seek housing elsewhere. Michel, supra note 35, at 468. The reason for 
this expulsion of lower-income residents from cities can be explained in part by decreased 
federal funds to provide services to the poor and the resulting pressure on municipal 
governments to finance services for the poor. Cities have few incentives to care for the poor 
because voter turnout among low-income people is limited. Byrne, supra note 10, at 421. Also, 
there is a general perception in municipal government that services for the poor are costly. 
Quinones, supra note 15, at 696. Instead of providing services, cities often choose to either 
ignore the needs of the poor or attempt to remove them from city boundaries entirely through 
redevelopment that replaces poor communities with wealthy ones. See id. According to 
Quinones, many municipal governments believe that ―the ideal city population contains several 
large sales tax generators, but no low income population.‖ Id. 
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impoverished city neighborhoods as residents must relocate to other 
low-income areas to find affordable housing.
73
 Second, it makes the 
lives of those lower-income families more costly. As affordable 
housing is destroyed without replacement, the market of affordable 
housing constricts,
74
 causing the cost of affordable housing to rise 
and forcing lower-income families to pay higher rents for the same 
low-quality housing.
75
 Relocated residents also may lose access to 
their jobs, as well as networks of neighbors, friends, and family that 
provided economic support such as child care arrangements or food 
sharing.
76
 Third, the forced migration can have a negative 
psychological and emotional impact on relocated families and 
 
 73. Michel, supra note 35, at 468. A potential result of this out migration is the 
development of illegal slums or squatter villages. If areas of the city with sufficient affordable 
housing do not exist, the lower-income groups may be forced to create their own settlements. 
See James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism, and Diversity: Progressive Planning 
Movements in America and their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 45, 71 (2002/2003). On the other hand, the forced migration may simply 
increase poverty in surrounding neighborhoods. Studies have shown that the majority of 
residents forced out by redevelopment projects generally only move within one mile of their 
original home. However, residents who once formed tight-knit communities generally end up 
dispersed within that radius. Quinones, supra note 15, at 737 n.175. 
 74. Parlow, supra note 67, at 848. Statistics demonstrate that there is a great unmet need 
for affordable housing that continues to grow. From 1973 to 1995, over 2 million affordable 
housing units in large U.S. cities were removed from the market. Id. at 847. During that same 
time period, the number of people in need of affordable housing increased. By 1999, only 4.9 
million affordable housing units existed, but 7.7 million extremely low-income households 
were in need of affordable housing. Even as the number of low income households was rising, 
local governments were actually lessening the total amount of affordable housing available. Id. 
at 847–48. These issues become even more pressing in the wake of the 2008 economic 
recession. A Center on Budget and Policy Priorities study shows that in 2008, the poverty rate 
rose to 13.2 percent, with 39.8 million people living below the poverty line, the highest number 
since 1960. In addition, median household income has declined. It is estimated that the poverty 
rate will continue to rise for several years following the recession, leaving more and more 
households in need of low cost housing. Arloc Sherman, Robert Greenstein, Danilo Trisi & 
Paul N. Van de Water, Poverty Rose, Median Income Declined, and Job-Based Health 
Insurance Continued to Weaken in 2008, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 1 (Sept. 10, 
2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-10-09pov.pdf. 
 75. Quinones, supra note 15, at 737 n.176. 
 76. Bezdek, supra note 18, at 67–68. These networks of ―mutually shared values and 
mutually shared concern and support is a necessary condition, not just to psychic well-being, 
but to physical survival itself.‖ Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban Redevelopment 
and the Loss of Community, 25 IND. L. REV. 685, 702 (1992). Lower-income individuals and 
families ―often depend on a web of mutual support consisting of a nonmonetary exchange of 
goods and services with each individual contributing to the others whatever meager abundance 
and special talents he might have.‖ Id. 
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individuals.
77
 In spite of commonly held views that lower-income 
individuals are extremely transient, many have lived in certain 
neighborhoods for much of their lives.
78
 Those forced to relocate 
experience grief and helplessness when their personal relationships 
are disrupted and their communities are dissolved.
79
  
The second irresponsible use of TIF funding is its application in 
suburban commercial redevelopment. Because blight and ―but for‖ 
standards have been fairly easy to satisfy,
80
 municipalities have used 
TIF to finance commercial redevelopment projects, such as shopping 
malls and big box stores, in affluent suburban areas.
81
 The use of TIF 
for suburban, commercial projects is contrary to and undermines the 
stated purpose of TIF to redevelop blighted areas. First, development 
in cities‘ far-flung suburbs only increases suburban sprawl. If the 
suburban development does not include construction of affordable 
housing in the suburbs or improved transportation to the suburbs, it 
further reduces impoverished communities‘ residents‘ ability to 
access jobs, retail, and services, which are more often located in the 
suburbs. Because most suburban redevelopment does not include 
 
 77. See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in 
URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 359, 359–61 (James Q. Wilson ed., 
1966).  
 78. See Quinones, supra note 15, at 738–39. In addition, economic circumstances may 
prevent lower-income residents from moving from their communities. Rent in these lower-
income neighborhoods is often significantly lower than in other parts of municipalities, tying 
many low-income residents to their communities. Id. 
 79. Fried, supra note 77, at 359–61. When relocating, individuals and families leave 
behind important social relationships such as those formed with neighbors or in religious 
institutions. Bezdek, supra note 18, at 67–68. The effect of being displaced in this manner has 
been compared to losing a close friend. Broussard, supra note 5, at 111. 
 80. See Gordon, supra note 20, at 305–06. The term blight in most statutes lacks a precise 
definition, giving developers and municipalities ―almost carte blanche in their creative search 
for ‗blighted‘ areas.‖ Id. For a discussion of the lack of enforcement of the ―but for‖ provisions, 
see id. at 323–25. In addition, some states have even done away with the blight requirement. 
See supra note 41. 
 81. See Goshorn, supra note 4, at 920. Two projects in St. Louis typify this type of 
development. In one suburban municipality, commercial development was planned to replace a 
well-established, middle-class neighborhood. TIF funds were requested to finance one-third of 
the total cost of the project to purchase the residential homes at two-and-a-half times their fair 
market value. Critics of this project felt that it was simply an effort to replace a residential 
neighborhood with a commercial district. Id. The second project was the expansion of one of 
the area‘s major suburban malls. See id.; see also Mihalopoulos, supra note 1. The Missouri 
court upheld both of these projects as satisfying the blight standard in the state‘s TIF statute. 
Goshorn, supra note 4, at 922. 
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affordable housing or transportation, the increasing suburban sprawl 
only heightens the isolation and poverty of poor urban 
communities.
82
 Second, the use of TIF financing in middle- and 
upper-income suburban communities lessens the incentive for 
developers to use TIF in impoverished communities; if developers 
can receive the same financial incentives offered by the government 
through TIF in a wealthier location better suited to development, then 
they will choose those wealthier locations over lower-income areas to 
carry out their development projects.
83
 Third, if TIF is used in areas 
that are not blighted, in which development would likely have 
occurred without it, the project will take increased tax revenue but 
will create no real benefit to the community, as the development 
would likely have occurred anyway.
84
 Therefore, the use of TIF in 
such circumstances is not cost-efficient for local governments.
85
  
Even if TIF is used responsibly in poor communities, another 
problem that could negatively affect low-income residents is the 
limited tax revenue available to the community during the TIF 
project.
86
 During the project, the tax base is frozen at pre-
redevelopment levels while the tax increment repays bonds.
87
 While 
the community continues to receive the amount of tax revenue it had 
received before the project, the redevelopment might (and is expected 
 
 82. Gordon, supra note 20, at 306–07. The use of TIF for this type of suburban 
development exacerbates blight in the inner cities. Id. at 307–08. 
 83. Michel, supra note 35, at 466. 
 84. Id. at 466–67. 
 85. Id. It has recently been argued that the use of TIF in poor, blighted communities is 
itself not efficient. In order for TIF bonds to be paid off quickly, the tax increment should rise 
quickly. Blighted areas may require a great deal of land clearing that could delay the time when 
the tax base, and thus the increment, starts to increase from the development. Moreover, if there 
is not already enough demand for growth in those areas, tax revenues may not increase quickly 
enough in order to raise a sufficient tax increment to pay off the bonds. This argument 
concludes that TIF should only be used in blighted neighborhoods if they are near areas that 
would create a high demand for new retail and growth. Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 68–70. A 
response to this argument is that redevelopment and gentrification have begun to occur already 
in many inner cities, so further development in nearby blighted areas could benefit from the 
demand for growth created by the influx of income and affluence into some parts of inner cities. 
In addition, many inner ring suburbs have become blighted as wealthy residents move further 
out to outer suburbs and as poverty from the inner cities bleeds outwards. These inner ring 
suburbs might be ideal places for TIF development because there is demand in more affluent 
suburbs just beyond the inner rings that could drive the development. 
 86. Michel, supra note 35, at 468. 
 87. London, supra note 31, at 780–81. 
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to) result in a higher population and more commercial or industrial 
development in the area, leading to a rising need for municipal 
services such as fire and police.
88
 School districts, in particular, suffer 
from increased population coupled with a lack of increased tax 
revenue to meet the need.
89
 The initial frozen tax base is likely 
insufficient to pay for these increased needs, leaving many of the 
needs unmet.
90
 Low income residents in particular rely on the 
provision of public services and will likely suffer if they are 
insufficient. In the alternative, to meet the increased needs, revenue 
can be raised from other parts of the city outside the redevelopment 
area. In that case, the rest of the city suffers as costs are externalized, 
but the benefit is only received in the redevelopment area.
91
  
A. Analysis of TIF Statutes 
Protections for the poor in TIF statutes generally include 
relocation assistance, (re)building of affordable housing, citizen 
 
 88. Id. at 809. 
 89. Id. Special districts and special purpose governments, like school districts, are often 
the hardest hit by increased demand for services without a corresponding increase in revenue. 
Peddle, supra note 31, at 452. Because many TIF projects run for upwards of twenty years, 
school districts may lose out on increased revenue for two generations of students or more. 
Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of 
Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 429 (2004). A common argument in response to 
concerns about school districts is that the property taxes in these redevelopment areas were 
declining before the TIF project began, so the freeze actually aids the school districts because it 
prevents the tax revenue from falling further. In addition, after the project is completed, the 
schools will benefit from much higher taxes. Peddle, supra note 31, at 445. 
 90. Dudley, supra note 33, at 82–83. Initially, the frozen tax base may benefit the 
redevelopment area because while land is being cleared and prepared for development, the land 
may decline in value, making the frozen tax base higher than what it would be given the land‘s 
value at that point. Id. at 83. Once development begins to bring in new businesses and property 
owners, however, the frozen tax revenue often becomes insufficient to meet demands for 
services. Id. Furthermore, if the city must raise property taxes in the area in response to changed 
conditions, residents would pay more in taxes, but still receive no increased benefit; rather, the 
redevelopment agency would obtain all of the benefit. Id. A common response to concerns 
about insufficient revenue when the tax base is frozen is that the community is not receiving 
any less revenue than it would have had without the project. Any increase in tax revenue since 
the project began resulted only from the redevelopment, so the area loses nothing it would have 
had without the redevelopment. Quinones, supra note 15, at 735. Still, if there is an increased 
demand for services as a result of redevelopment and no increased revenue, residents end up 
receiving fewer services for the same amount of tax paid. Id. at 734. 
 91. London, supra note 31, at 809.  
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participation, or provision of funding for schools.
92
 However, many 
of these provisions do not provide adequate protection for lower-
income residents of redevelopment districts. 
Relocation assistance, such as payments to displaced families for 
moving costs, is essential for lower-income residents displaced by 
redevelopment projects because these lower-income groups lack 
resources such as time, money, and interpersonal networks to locate 
adequate low-cost housing and to pay for moving expenses and 
security deposits.
93
 Many state statutes contemplate relocation 
assistance, but often fall short of providing effective support. For 
example, both Missouri and Illinois provide that relocation costs can 
be paid by developers or the local government to those relocated by 
the project; however, in both cases, the statute says only that the costs 
are to be paid if federal, state, or local law requires.
94
 These 
requirements are ineffective if none of the three levels of government 
compels assistance.
95
 Some states also require that developers create 
relocation plans, which describe how the displaced individuals will 
be relocated.
96
 Such plans may still be ineffective if the state does not 
 
 92. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 93. Broussard, supra note 5, at 110. Low-income residents face even more difficulty in 
obtaining the resources needed to relocate if they reside in areas with tight housing markets. Id. 
 94. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.805(15)(i) (West 2008); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ADV. 
620/3(e)(8) (West 2008). Wisconsin also provides that the housing authority involved in the 
redevelopment ―may‖ make relocation assistance payments to displaced residents, but such 
payments are not required. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1333(10) (West Supp. 2010). 
 95. These requirements are likely ineffective at all three levels of government. 
Municipalities are unlikely to require themselves to pay relocation costs or to ask developers to 
do so, which might be a disincentive for development. The state government had the 
opportunity to require payment of these costs by including such a provision in the TIF statute 
itself, but in failing to do so, the state government signaled it is also unlikely to require such 
payments. Finally, there are some federal regulations that require the payment of relocation 
assistance, but these regulations apply only to federal projects or projects receiving federal 
funds. See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for Federal and 
Federally-Assisted Programs, 49 C.F.R. § 24.1 (2009). TIF funding is primarily used by 
municipalities in place of federal funding.  
 96. Michigan requires the redevelopment authority to create a plan that includes 
information about the people being displaced, including their income and race, and a 
description of the housing supply in the community. The proposal must also include a plan for 
―establishing priority for the relocation of persons displaced by the development in any new 
housing in the development area.‖ MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 125.1816(2)(m)-(n) (West 
2006). The effectiveness of this statute is limited by a lack of precise standards for ensuring that 
the creation of the plan will in fact lead to the re-housing of displaced individuals at costs they 
can afford.  
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simultaneously require relocation assistance payments or the 
replacement of low-cost housing destroyed in the redevelopment.  
The Iowa TIF statute demonstrates the limited effectiveness of 
requirements for protection of low- and moderate-income individuals. 
Iowa‘s statute requires both relocation assistance and the re-building 
of low-income units taken in the redevelopment.
97
 This broad 
protective language is severely limited, though, by several loopholes 
in the statutory language and in case law construing the statute. First, 
a later section of the statute states that municipalities will not be 
required to meet the low-income assistance requirements if the 
municipality can demonstrate that it ―cannot undertake the project if 
it has to meet the low and moderate income assistance 
requirements.‖98 Low-income assistance requirements may put a 
strain on many development projects, and developers for these 
strained projects may be able to claim that they would not be able to 
complete the development and meet the low-income requirements. 
Thus, redevelopment that destroys lower-income housing may be 
 
 Wisconsin‘s statute goes further by actually stating that the plan must ensure that 
individuals are re-housed. The housing authority‘s plan in Wisconsin must include a feasible 
method for temporary relocation of displaced persons and must ensure that ―decent, safe, and 
sanitary dwellings substantially equal in number‖ to those taken through the redevelopment, at 
rent or prices ―within the financial reach of the income groups displaced,‖ will be available 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1331(7) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Still, the rebuilding of affordable 
housing units in sufficient numbers is questionable given the qualifying language that the units 
must be replaced in ―substantially‖ equal numbers. Moreover, requiring the cost of alternative 
housing to be ―within the reach‖ of the displaced residents does not require that the cost be 
equal to the previous cost, and will allow the housing authority or developer to make a 
discretionary decision about what is within the reach of the lower income individuals‘ income. 
See id. 
 Finally, some states‘ statutes are quite limited in their requirement of a relocation plan. 
Texas states only that the project plan must include ―a statement of a method of relocating 
persons to be displaced as a result of implementing the plan,‖ with no further mention of 
assistance in relocation nor of protections for those being relocated. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 
§ 311.011(b)(4) (West 2008). A requirement merely for a statement of the method to relocate 
does nothing to ensure that the proposed relocation assistance is sufficient to meet the needs of 
lower-income residents or that relocation assistance actually occurs. 
 97. The statute requires that redevelopment may only occur if a ―method exists for the 
location of families who will be displaced . . . into decent, safe and sanitary dwelling 
accommodations within their means and without undue hardship to such families.‖ IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 403.5(4)(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). This method can include the construction of 
low-income units either inside or outside the redevelopment area, payments to a housing fund, 
or direct assistance to families. IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.22 (West Supp. 2010). 
 98. IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.22 (West 2009). 
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permitted to move forward with no requirement that affordable 
housing be replaced. Second, the Iowa Supreme Court has construed 
the low-income requirements to apply only to residential 
development. Thus, development that is commercial or industrial, 
even if it destroys low-income residences, is not required to assist 
low-income families displaced by the redevelopment.
99
 
In addition to protections in TIF statutes specifically directed 
toward low- and moderate-income residents, some states have 
requirements designed to protect entire communities facing 
redevelopment, including citizen participation requirements and 
funding set aside for schools.
100
 While not explicitly aimed at lower-
income residents, these statutes may nevertheless serve to protect 
them. Michigan‘s TIF statute contains a requirement that in 
redevelopment areas in which more than one hundred people live, a 
development area citizens‘ council must be formed.101 Many scholars 
argue that providing a venue for citizen participation is central to 
redevelopment that is responsible to the original residents,
102
 and 
such requirements can protect low-income residents if they are 
represented on the citizens‘ council. However, historically, citizen 
participation efforts have faced difficulty in capturing the voices of 
the lowest-income residents, leaving them without the protection a 
citizens‘ council could provide.103 Another community-wide 
protection involves the setting aside of a portion of the bond 
 
 99. Compare McMurray v. City Council of Des Moines, 642 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 2002) 
(holding that the city must provide for low- and moderate-income assistance only when the 
redevelopment is for housing or residential redevelopment and that because this development‘s 
purpose was commercial, no low- or moderate-income assistance was required), with Knudson 
v. City of Decorah, 622 N.W. 2d 42 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the city must provide low- and 
moderate-income assistance because the redevelopment was residential in nature).  
 100. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1820 (West 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 66.1333 (5r) (West Supp. 2010). 
 101. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.1820 (West 2006). One limitation on this body is that 
it acts only as an advisory board to the redevelopment authority. Therefore, the authority is not 
required to follow the advice and suggestions of the citizens‘ board. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 83 (arguing for the use of Community Benefit 
Agreements in redevelopment plans, in which community groups and developers negotiate 
contracts; in return for their support in the project, community groups can require developers to 
meet specific community needs); Quinones, supra note 15, at 698 (calling for ―resident-
controlled redevelopment‖ by which two thirds of the redevelopment agency board is composed 
of residents who have full decision-making authority). 
 103. MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 231. 
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payments or the tax increment to be used to pay for school district 
improvements.
104
 These types of requirements counterbalance the 
negative effect on schools and other municipal bodies when the tax 
level they will receive is frozen at pre-redevelopment levels.
105
 
B. TIF in California 
Over the last decade, California has enacted a series of statutory 
provisions to encourage the protection of lower-income residents. 
Before these changes, California TIF projects were shown to have 
little to no community benefit, instead taking millions of property tax 
dollars from local governments and special districts such as school 
districts.
106
 
The redefined statutory provisions first provide that local 
governments must offer incentives or concessions to developers who 
produce affordable housing and child care facilities or who set aside 
certain percentages of their units for moderate-, low-, and very low-
income housing or elderly housing.
107
 The provisions also require that 
at least 20 percent of the increment be used for ―increasing, 
improving, and preserving‖ low- and moderate-income housing at 
affordable prices.
108
 California courts have enforced this provision to 
ensure that sufficient money is provided for affordable housing.
109
 
 
 104. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1333(5r) (West Supp. 2010). Based on legislative findings 
that new public schools will help lessen the poor conditions of the communities in need of 
redevelopment, the statute allows the city to issue bonds to ―finance or refinance the 
development or redevelopment of sites and facilities to be used for public school facilities.‖ Id. 
 105. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 98. The same has been true of TIF projects in many 
other states. Id. 
 107. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 65915 (West 2009). In order to receive incentives, developers 
should set aside 10 percent of units for low income, 5 percent for very low-income, or 10 
percent for moderate-income. Id. 
 108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33334.2 (West 2009). This provision does contain a 
loophole. The developer does not need to follow this requirement if it can be shown that no 
need for affordable housing exists or that less than 20 percent of the increment is needed to 
provide adequate affordable housing. Id. 
 109. See Craig v. City of Poway, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 1994) 
(holding that a redevelopment agency cannot take money from an affordable housing fund to 
pay for other costs, such as sidewalks, and that 20 percent of all taxes allocated to the agency 
and 20 percent of proceeds from the tax increment go to affordable housing); see also Fontana 
Redevelopment Agency v. Torres, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2007) 
(invalidating the redevelopment bond in question and noting that one reason for doing so was 
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Finally, California law requires that if a redevelopment plan destroys 
low- and moderate-income homes, they must be replaced in equal 
numbers within four years.
110
 
Under these provisions, redevelopment has occurred in California 
that does provide for the needs of lower-income people. For example, 
over the past two decades, City Heights Community Development 
Corporation in San Diego has built or rehabilitated over 700 
affordable housing units and provides services such as employment 
support for lower-income residents of that community.
111
 In addition, 
the Public Interest Law Project out of Oakland, California, has used 
the statutory provisions to negotiate with developers to ensure that 
they provide the required amount of affordable housing in 
redevelopment projects.
112
 
C. The Need for Responsible Redevelopment 
Cities cannot continue to ignore what happens to lower-income 
residents and allow redevelopment to displace them. Such relocations 
have negative consequences not just for residents, but for the city as a 
whole. Displaced lower income residents generally do not move far 
from their former neighborhood.
113
 Therefore, the problems found in 
 
its lack of a provision requiring 20 percent of the increment to be contributed to affordable 
housing). 
 110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413 (West Supp. 2010). A federal court construing 
this statute held that a redevelopment agency must replace low-income housing, even when it 
was low-income hotels for homeless people that had been destroyed, and the city itself had 
requested their removal. Price v. City of Stockton, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1264–67 (E.D. Cal. 
2005).  
 111. Economic Self-Sufficiency and Investment, CITY HEIGHTS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
CORP., http://www.cityheightscdc.org/community.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011); Housing 
Operations, CITY HEIGHTS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORP., http://www.cityheightscdc.org/ 
housing.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 112. In 2009, the California Affordable Housing Law Project reached a settlement with a 
redevelopment agency that required the agency to fulfill the statutory requirements for 
affordable housing by building replacement units and inclusionary housing as well as making 
payments into the low- and moderate-income housing fund. Affordable Housing Litigation: 
Ongoing Litigation, PUB. INT. L. PROJECT, http://www.pilpca.org/www/litigation/housing.html 
(Rogel V. Lynwood Redevelopment Agency) (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 113. Quinones, supra note 15, at 737 n.175. Lower-income residents forcibly relocated 
from their communities during urban redevelopment generally do not move far from their 
original residences. For example, a study in Minneapolis demonstrated that 70 to 80 percent of 
these residents relocated within a one-mile radius from their original home; another study in 
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lower-income neighborhoods do not disappear; they simply move 
down a few blocks.
114
 Also, lower-income individuals‘ movement out 
of certain neighborhoods and into others increases the burden on their 
new neighborhoods, which are generally poor neighborhoods 
themselves.
115
 The relocation increases the concentration of poverty 
in these communities, which can increase social isolation and social 
disruption, leading to decreased education and increased joblessness 
and crime.
116
 In addition, what were already poor communities with 
few resources to aid lower-income families become even more 
financially burdened by the influx of increasing numbers of lower-
income individuals and families for whom they also must provide 
services.
117
 The increasing concentration of poverty in areas with 
insufficient social services creates social problems, like crime, that 
generally cannot be contained in one area of the city.
118
 Therefore, for 
the sake of the entire city, local governments should ensure that 
lower-income residents are lifted as their communities are 
redeveloped.
119
 
 
New Jersey similarly demonstrated that the majority of relocated residents (74 percent) moved 
within six blocks of their original home. Id. Therefore, without improved efforts to retain lower-
income residents in their original communities during redevelopment, the surrounding areas 
will absorb them and may begin to face the problems associated with poverty. 
 114. Id. at 736–37. 
 115. Michel, supra note 35, at 468.  
 116. Quinones, supra note 15, at 739; see also WILSON, supra note 6, at 55–62. 
Concentration of poverty has been increasing for several decades. In his work on poverty, the 
city, and the ―underclass,‖ Wilson notes that in the five largest cities in the United States during 
the 1970s and 1980s, the number of poor living in areas considered high-poverty rose 69 
percent and in areas considered extreme-poverty rose 161 percent. Id. at 46. Poverty increased 
in these areas through two different types of migrations: middle- and upper-income individuals 
and families moved out of these communities, and lower-income individuals moved in. Id. at 
49–55. Wilson explained that the resulting social problems were caused by the lack of the social 
buffer created by the presence of middle- and upper-income individuals who helped to maintain 
the social institutions of the community, such as churches, schools, stores, and recreational 
facilities. Without these institutions, and without the model of an educated middle class 
working in stable jobs, social problems such as joblessness, the underground economy, and 
crime, increased. Id. at 56–57. 
 117. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 13, at 610. 
 118. St. Louis provides a good example of the spread of crime from poverty-stricken areas 
to other parts of the city. For several decades, gangs have been a problem in the northern part of 
the city of St. Louis. Recently, the gang activity has begun to spread into the southern part of 
the city. Chad Garrison, Battle Lines, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.river 
fronttimes.com/2006-08-23/news/battle-lines/1. 
 119. The victims of natural disasters, who often lose both their homes and communities, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Protecting Low Income Residents 225 
 
 
D. Strengths of TIF 
In spite of its weaknesses, there are reasons that TIF should be 
reformed and salvaged, the most important being that it may be one 
of the few viable tools that local governments have to do 
comprehensive urban redevelopment. Redevelopment powers like 
TIF have been called ―some of the few arrows left in the quiver of 
cities which must fend off economic decline.‖120 The costs of 
economic revitalization have increasingly shifted to cities, so 
financing schemes such as TIF are necessary to aid cities in economic 
revitalization.
121
 With certain statutory limits on TIF and its use in 
combination with other funding and service provision mechanisms, 
the worst of its problems may be overcome. 
TIF allows municipalities to fund urban redevelopment without a 
great deal of financial stress.
122
 The city is able to issue tax exempt 
bonds with low interest rates that will be paid from the increment 
rather than from the general funds of the city.
123
 In addition, after the 
bonds have been paid, the local municipal government as well as 
local non-municipal districts, such as school districts, will benefit 
from increased taxes from the revitalized area.
124
  
As long as revitalization occurs, TIF projects bring benefits both 
to the TIF development area itself and to surrounding areas. While 
there may be decreases in services or increases in taxes during the life 
 
have been compared to the victims of gentrification, who essentially lose the same as they are 
pushed out of their communities. However, ―[a]lthough the devastation of community, family, 
and lives is just as complete when the disaster is the government-sanctioned wrecking ball, 
comparable sympathy is not commonplace for urban redevelopment refugees.‖ Bezdek, supra 
note 18, at 37–41. 
 120. Quinones, supra note 15, at 692. Quinones goes on to point out that as few of the 
redevelopment projects have been successful in revitalizing cities, a fundamental change must 
occur in the method of redevelopment. Id. at 693. 
 121. See id. at 705. 
 122. Peddle, supra note 31, at 445. 
 123. London, supra note 31, at 780. 
 124. See Peddle, supra note 31, at 445. It is possible to view the tax increment allocation 
that takes increased tax revenue away from non-municipal governments and special districts as 
a payment to the municipality, which supported the majority of the initial cost of the 
infrastructure and development. The payment arguably produces net gains to all, in that after 
the TIF project has run, all local governments and special districts benefit from an increased 
property tax base which would likely not have developed without the TIF, if the area were truly 
blighted. Id. 
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of the TIF project, the project can bring benefits in the long term such 
as decreased crime and poverty and improved health.
125
 However, 
given the fact that low-income residents pushed out of neighborhoods 
when TIF is used irresponsibly do not move far, benefits from TIF 
will only accrue to surrounding areas if measures are taken to allow 
low income residents to remain in the TIF district and benefit from 
the redevelopment as well.
126
 
Finally, gentrification that occurs with TIF redevelopment may be 
good for impoverished communities to the extent that lower-income 
individuals are not displaced, and sufficient affordable housing is 
maintained. In fact, some level of gentrification may be necessary, in 
that it brings in residents of higher-income levels who increase the 
district‘s tax base and can improve the economy, thus reversing the 
drain of resources that occurred from middle- and upper-income 
families‘ movement to the suburbs.127 First, the influx of higher-
income individuals creates more jobs as there is increased demand for 
services, both private and public.
128
 Second, migration of higher-
income residents into poor communities may bring political benefits. 
If the higher- and lower-income residents are seeking the same goals, 
such as good city services and schools, then the increase in wealthy 
voters may bring a corresponding increase in political power for 
 
 125. London, supra note 31, at 809–10. To the extent that surrounding areas were required 
to bear the costs of providing services to meet increasing needs in the TIF district during the life 
of the TIF project, these costs might be outweighed by benefits accruing to surrounding areas 
from the redevelopment itself. Benefits of improved safety and welfare in the formerly blighted 
area will likely extend to the surrounding areas. On the other hand, without the development in 
the blighted area funded through the TIF project, these surrounding areas would have felt the 
effects of crime and poverty in the blighted area that spilled outside of its boundaries. Id.; see 
also Peddle, supra note 31, at 445; 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-2 (West 2005). 
Illinois‘ legislative findings note that local taxing districts will all benefit from the ―removal of 
blighted conditions.‖ Id. 
 126. Quinones, supra note 15, at 737 n.175. 
 127. Byrne, supra note 10, at 418–19. 
 128. Id. at 419–20. Typically, low-income individuals are better able to locate employment 
in the suburbs where higher-income communities create demand for goods and services. 
However, many low-income residents of the inner-city and inner-ring suburbs are unable to 
access those jobs because of limited transportation. Id. at 419. Introducing higher-income 
residents into the central city and inner-ring suburbs replicates those employment opportunities 
but in locations more easily accessible to lower-income workers. Id. at 419–20. Furthermore, 
because these jobs are often low-paying and require few skills, the higher-income individuals 
moving into these neighborhoods will likely not compete with the lower-income residents for 
these jobs. Id. at 419. 
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lower-income residents.
129
 Finally, the movement of more affluent 
residents into lower-income communities reverses the social isolation 
that resulted from the flight of middle- and high-income residents to 
the suburbs.
130
 However, in order for gentrification to be truly 
beneficial to low-income people, redevelopment must include 
provisions for affordable housing and other supportive social services 
to help the lower-income residents thrive from the redevelopment 
project as well. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The current TIF funding scheme in most states needs to be 
reformed in order to redevelop declining inner cities and inner-ring 
suburbs in a manner that is responsible to the current residents of 
those communities. First, the blight standard should be enforced so 
that TIF will be used primarily in the neediest areas.
131
  
Next, statutory reforms should be made to protect low income 
residents. Other states should emulate California and enact statutes 
that require that affordable housing be rebuilt in at least equal 
numbers if it is destroyed in the redevelopment process.
132
 In 
addition, redevelopment projects in higher-income areas should be 
required to include affordable housing, even if none was destroyed in 
the project.
133
 In order to fund the construction of affordable housing, 
 
 129. Id. at 421. 
 130. See WILSON, supra note 6, at 143. It has been argued that because of the great cultural 
gap between wealthy, white new residents and the poor minorities who already live in these 
central cities, there will be little real interaction between the two groups that could reverse the 
problems of social isolation of the poor. Byrne, supra note 10, at 421–23. Even if this is the 
case, the benefits to lower income residents may still accrue in the form of improved economic 
and political power.  
 131. If the blight standard is enforced, developers will have an incentive to build in those 
neediest areas because they will only be able to receive the tax benefits of TIF for those areas. 
The blight standard also protects the municipality from unnecessarily losing tax revenue from 
TIF projects in wealthier areas that would have been developed even without the tax incentive 
from TIF. See Michel, supra note 35, at 466.  
 132. See supra notes 107–10. 
 133. The actual number of affordable housing units available has been declining over the 
last several decades even as the number of people in need of low-cost housing has risen over the 
same time period. Parlow, supra note 67, at 847–50. It may be necessary for more than the 
number of affordable housing units that are destroyed to be rebuilt in order to make up for the 
current insufficiency of low-cost housing units.  
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developers should be given the choice of either using a certain 
percentage of their redevelopment funds to produce the housing 
themselves or paying a slightly higher percentage of their funds 
directly to the municipal government as a penalty for failing to build 
affordable housing in their project.
134
 The government would then use 
the penalty funds to build affordable housing itself.
135
 The developer 
would set aside funds for affordable housing either from the original 
amount of money raised from selling bonds, which could be put into 
an escrow account reserved for affordable housing, or from reserving 
a portion of the tax increment after the project has begun.
136
 Statutory 
 
 134. One of the concerns that may arise in requiring developers to pay for the construction 
of affordable housing is that it may be costly to force developers to shoulder this burden. 
However, developers are receiving a benefit from the government in return for their 
investment—namely tax exempt bonds, which allow developers to save money by paying a 
lower interest rate on the bonds.  
 There may also be the concern that requirements to fund affordable housing will act as a 
disincentive to developers doing projects in blighted areas. A potential solution to this problem 
would be to require inclusionary housing, by which any developer would be obligated to either 
construct or pay a fee for affordable housing, whether or not their project destroyed any low-
cost housing. See id. at 861. Inclusionary housing could also be encouraged by conditioning 
building permits on the construction of a certain amount of affordable housing in development. 
Michèle Alexandre, ―Love Don’t Live Here Anymore”: Economic Incentives for a More 
Equitable Model of Urban Development, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 38 (2008). An 
inclusionary housing requirement would remove the disincentive for developers working in 
low-income areas because they would be required to set aside funds for affordable housing no 
matter where the development occurred. Moreover, developers would have an incentive to do 
projects in low-income neighborhoods, where they would have access to the tax exempt bonds 
through TIF, rather than in higher-income areas, where bonds would not be tax exempt, as the 
federal government only provides tax exempt bonds if redevelopment is in a blighted area. 
MANDELKER, supra note 29, at 387–88.  
 135. This funding scheme would allow developers to choose whether to build the housing 
or pay the fee, based on the needs of the development project. The purpose is to incentivize the 
developers to build the housing, which they may be able to do more efficiently than the 
government. But if the developers choose not to build the housing, the government can avoid 
some costs of enforcement by simply extracting a fee, rather than trying to force the developers 
to build the housing, and through the fee, the government earns additional funds to build the 
housing. 
 136. The difficulty in setting aside money from the original bond amount is that the 
beginning of the project may be delayed since more money will have to be raised initially. On 
the other hand, the problem in reserving a portion of the increment instead is that the time 
needed to pay off the bonds, and thus the project‘s life, will lengthen because the full increment 
will not be available to pay the bonds. It may be least harmful to the community to set aside 
money initially from the bonds, which will delay the start of the project, but during which time 
the community will continue to receive the full amount of their tax revenue. In contrast, 
reserving a portion of the tax increment and extending the life of the project would cause the 
community to receive only the tax revenue at its frozen level for that extended period of time, 
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provisions such as those in California statutes requiring replacement 
affordable housing have been successful in holding developers 
accountable to providing sufficient affordable housing.
137
  
While essential to responsible development that protects low-
income residents, the existence of affordable housing alone is not 
sufficient to ensure that displacement does not occur during 
redevelopment. Statutes should also include provisions that require 
relocation assistance to help support lower-income residents. 
Monetary assistance, while important, may be insufficient to help 
low-income residents return to their communities. A better option 
would require the municipal government or development agencies
138
 
to be responsible for keeping track of lower-income families who 
express a desire to return to their communities, helping them relocate 
during the construction and also assisting them in moving back into 
the community once the development has been completed.
139
 
 
an amount which may be inadequate to meet its needs after the development is completed. 
London, supra note 31, at 809. 
 137. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33413 (West 2009); see also supra note 112.  
 138. Either the development agency or the municipal government could be responsible for 
relocation assistance. It may be more logical to require the government to take on this 
responsibility both because it will be the entity negatively affected if displacement injures the 
lower-income residents and because it will stand to benefit in the long run if lower-income 
residents are able to successfully remain in their community. If low-income residents are not 
provided assistance and simply pushed into other low-income neighborhoods, the municipal 
government will face the negative economic effects of increasing concentrations of poverty in 
the municipality. Quinones, supra note 15, at 739. On the other hand, if the lower-income 
residents are successfully integrated into a redeveloped neighborhood that can provide them 
with better educational opportunities and jobs, the municipal government will benefit from 
increased tax revenue and decreased need for government-funded social services. The long-
term benefit to the municipality of a strong, viable community will outweigh the initial cost of 
providing effective relocation assistance that allows low-income residents to return to their 
communities and benefit from the redevelopment.  
 139. An example of an organization that tracks and supports lower-income families in this 
manner is Urban Strategies, an affordable housing provider out of St. Louis, Missouri. After 
Hurricane Katrina, Urban Strategies located families that were displaced from the affordable 
housing complex they were redeveloping. Those families who wished to return to their previous 
neighborhoods were provided with services to help them move back to New Orleans. Tanu 
Henry, Four Years After Katrina, 90 “Magnolia” Housing Project Families Get Ready for 
Homecoming, BET.COM, http://www.bet.com/News/Four_Years_After_Katrina_New_Orleans_ 
Residents_Prepare_for_Homecoming.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). In order for the tracking of 
families and relocation assistance to work, the number of affordable units demolished must be 
exactly matched or exceeded by the number rebuilt. Furthermore, the developer should not 
require families to meet stringent conditions to be allowed to move back into the neighborhood; 
rather, the invitation should be open to almost all. A poor example of allowing families to move 
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Alternatively, the development agency should conduct the 
development in phases, with the first phase including housing for 
lower-income residents. Thus, residents displaced by later phases of 
the redevelopment could move straight into the project‘s affordable 
housing units rather than having to first move out of the project area 
and then back into the area.
140
 
TIF funding for overall redevelopment should be supplemented 
with federal money dedicated specifically to affordable housing, 
which will both decrease the amount of local development funds 
required for affordable housing and provide greater protection for 
low-income residents. The National Housing Trust Fund, created in 
2008 by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act,
141
 and the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program are two examples of current 
federal funding programs targeted at increasing housing for 
moderate-, low-, and extremely low-income residents.
142
 In addition 
 
back occurred in Metropolitan Gardens, a housing project in Birmingham, AL. In 1999, the 
projects were demolished and lower-income residents who wished to return to the rebuilt 
affordable housing were required to meet certain strict conditions such as good rent payment 
history. Furthermore, the number of affordable and elderly housing units available in the new 
development was only one-third of that provided in the original projects. Broussard, supra note 
5, at 108.  
 140. While containing few to no provisions for affordable housing, Paul McKee‘s plan to 
revitalize the north side of St. Louis city demonstrates the feasibility of conducting a large-scale 
development project in phases. See Logan, supra note 2, at A1. One potential concern with 
having the first phase of the project contain affordable housing is that the affordable housing 
may not create a large enough initial tax increment to begin paying off the project‘s bonds. To 
avoid this problem in repaying the bonds, it may be necessary for the first phase to also include 
development that will create a larger tax increment, such as commercial, industrial, or higher-
income housing. 
 141. Kathie Soroka, A Brief Analysis of the National Housing Trust Fund, 18 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 13, 13 (2008). This act is the first federal act in 
over twenty years that specifically targets extremely low-income people and the first in over 
thirty years to provide for the production of extremely low-income housing. Id. 
 142. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, NEIGHBORHOOD 
STABILIZATION PROGRAM GRANTS, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/ 
programs/neighborhoodspg/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). The grant program was originally 
authorized under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Grant money was re-
allocated to the program in 2009 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Twenty-
five percent of these funds must be used for ―purchase and redevelopment of abandoned or 
foreclosed homes or residential properties that will be used to house individuals or families 
whose incomes do not exceed 50 percent of the area median income.‖ Moreover, all of the 
funds from the Neighborhood Stabilization Program grants must be used to benefit individuals 
and families with incomes not exceeding 120 percent of area median income, focusing the 
grants toward low and moderate income households. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Protecting Low Income Residents 231 
 
 
to providing more money for affordable housing, federal money 
provides increased protection for low-income residents. For any 
individual displaced by federal or federally-assisted projects, the 
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition for 
Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs regulation
143
 requires that 
before a person can be removed from his or her housing, there must 
be a comparable replacement dwelling available, and relocation 
assistance payments must be made. The regulation also requires one-
to-one replacement of low income units destroyed in the project.
144
 
Finally, in order to ensure continued provision of adequate 
services during TIF projects, developers should set aside a portion of 
the tax increment or of the initial bond amount to provide funds for 
police protection and special districts, particularly school districts, 
whose burden may increase as the community grows from 
redevelopment.
145
 Ensuring adequate education in the TIF district is 
essential to creating an economically viable community with a job-
ready population.
146
 Money should also be set aside from the tax 
increment or initial bond amount to provide social services to aid 
lower-income individuals in fully integrating into the revitalized 
community and economy, such as job training, child care, and 
business incubators for small businesses.
147
 
 
 143. 49 C.F.R. § 24 (2004). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Paying the entire tax increment to the development agency limits tax revenue 
available to the TIF district for social services and schools, even if the population grows during 
the project. London, supra note 31, at 809. 
 146. Recognizing that adequate education in particular is essential for an economically 
viable community, some states have provisions that allow for funding specifically for school 
districts. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1333(5r) (West 2009). In Wisconsin, development authorities 
may issue bonds to finance development of facilities for schools. Id. Other states‘ plans to 
protect resources for education include payments in lieu of taxes paid by developers to school 
districts to offset lost revenue, payments from state governments to return lost revenue from the 
tax freeze, and opportunities for school districts to take part in the decision-making about TIF 
projects. Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 83–84. Missouri provides for payments in lieu of taxes. 
Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio require the state to make up lost revenue and allow school 
districts to comment on any TIF projects that may redirect funds away from school districts. 
Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Utah allow school districts to participate in the 
planning and decision-making process. Id. at 83–84 nn.179–81. 
 147. Michel, supra note 35, at 478. An example of this kind of set aside at the federal level 
is found in Community Development Block Grants, which require that funds be used to benefit 
low income groups and list activities such as ―those concerned with . . . crime prevention, child 
care, health, drug abuse, education, energy conservation, welfare, or recreation needs‖ or 
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CONCLUSION 
With few funding options available for cities to engage in 
redevelopment of poor communities, tax increment financing 
provides a method for redevelopment that cities can financially 
support. However, tax increment financing can be used in ways that 
injure lower-income residents of those poor communities. Care must 
be taken that TIF projects are designed to meet the needs of those 
residents, to support them in moving out of poverty at the same time 
that the neighborhood itself is being lifted up. Cities should not 
ignore their lowest-income residents and force them from their 
communities in the name of urban redevelopment and revitalization. 
 
payments to local non-profit organizations to do community revitalization. 42 U.S.C. § 5305 
(2006). In the 1980s and 1990s, successful redevelopment occurred in South Beach, Florida, 
that allowed lower-income residents to remain in their communities by providing social 
services from redevelopment funds. See Michelle S. Viegas, Community Development and the 
South Beach Success Story, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 389 (2005). 
 Another method to protect lower-income residents‘ needs during redevelopment is to 
require citizen participation in the TIF proposal and redevelopment planning. Lefcoe suggests 
the creation of Community Benefit Agreements, or contracts between community groups and 
developers, in which groups can negotiate for benefits that specifically address the area‘s needs, 
such as job training or child care. Other negotiated benefits could include affordable housing 
units, requirements to employ local workers, and commitments to develop adequate numbers of 
living wage jobs. Lefcoe, supra note 60, at 96. Some states, such as California, allow resident 
participation in planning committees for the projects, but often do not give residents the right to 
vote on development plans. Citizens involved in the planning for their own communities should 
be given the power to vote on redevelopment proposals. Michel, supra note 35, at 473. 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/9
